'Problem of Induction: An Analysis of the Validity of the Humean Problem of Induction\r'

'Induction refers to â€Å"a method of reasoning by which a everyday law or rationale is inferred from observed specific instances” (Flew, 1986, p. 171). The method of inductive inference, in this sense, whitethorn be considered as the primary means through which justifications are formulated to show the relationship of evidence towards concomitant assumptions (Good humanness, 1983, p. 13). The process of certainty, thereby, whitethorn be seen as arising whenever we comment that evidence lends support to a hypothesis bit in the process failing to establish its deductive certainty.\r\nIn relation to the said(prenominal) method, Hume argued that since no necessary connections exists between empirical phenomena, it is always possible that a future observation will prove our inferences incorrectly no matter how appealing it may take for been or how richly supported by previous(prenominal) observations. This problem has been referred to as the problem of the consisten cy principle [in this sense the lack of much(prenominal) uniformity]. correspond to the argument, nature has no uniformity. If much(prenominal) is the case, it thereby follows that there is no voucher that ensures the consistency of man’s most refined predictions.\r\nConsider for example, the statement â€Å"Whenever I smooth off a piece of codsw all toldop it will fall”. Two claims may be inferred from such a statement: (1) Dropping a piece of ice-skating rink causes it to fall and (2) Dropping a piece of chalk tomorrow will thereby cause it to fall. According to Hume, such claims assume the uniformity of nature. The problem until now is evident if one considers that if all companionship of condition is base on experience and all knowledge of experience is based on the faculties of cognition, in holy order for knowledge of causation to be validated [at all times] it is necessary that the faculties of cognition are infallible.\r\nHowever, such is not the case since conditions for the attainment of brain are based upon fallible faculties. If such is the case, it follows that man’s understanding of the empirical valet is obscure thereby providing no solid grounds for the formation of inferences that determine the uniformity of nature from which man derives his causal laws regarding the workings of nature. At this point, it is worthwhile to consider that the aforementioned problem [commonly referred to as Hume’s problem of induction] stems from Hume’s critique of the Cartesian claims regarding the powers of reason.\r\nAccording to Descartes, man is in possession of an infallible faculty of clear and distinct perception which if correctly exercised is able to grasp various general causal principles a priori. In addition to this, Descartes claims that possession of such faculties enables man to establish the essence of the mind [which is thinking] and the tree trunk [which is extension] through the use of pure i ntellectual insight. If such is the case, man is thereby privy to the encyclopaedism of a priori knowledge regarding the behavior of minds and of things.\r\nIf such is the case, it follows that man is as well privy to the knowledge of the workings of the external world [external to the mind and hence the physical realm]. As was famed at the onset of this paper, Hume’s critique of Descartes’ intent of the powers of reason has thereby resulted to the critique of the process of induction and hence the critique of the assumption regarding the uniformity of nature. It is master(prenominal) to note that Hume’s claim [as an opposition to Descartes’ aforementioned claim] may be understood in devil ways.\r\nIn the first case, Hume’s claim may be understood as setting the limits of man’s intellectual capacities [which is evident in his accent on the fallibility of our faculties for cognition]. In another sense, one may understand Hume’s claim as alter a naturalistic conception of knowledge acquisition thereby enabling the dissolution of Descartes’ dualism [evident in Descartes’ trace of the mind from the body]. The importance of such lies in its fury on the necessity to set solid foundations for the acquisition of belief.\r\nWithin these grounds, it is thereby possible to understand Hume’s subtitle to A Treatise of Human Nature, which states, â€Å"Being an onrush to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into clean-living Subjects”. Hume’s naturalized epistemology may thereby be seen as an attempt to enable the provision of valid and indubitable grounds for the formation of beliefs within some(prenominal) the empirical and moral realms of human existence.\r\n'